and Substance in Anglo-American Law, makes the more general claim that American law is more substantive, British law more formal (see also Krotoszynski, 1990) . On the other hand, the comparative literature on regulatory enforcement concludes that enforcement in other nations is less formal than in the United States (see generally, Bardach and Kagan, 1982; Braithwaite, 1987) , including Britain (Day and Klein, 1987; Hawkins, 1984; Vogel, 1986) , Sweden (Kelman, 1981) , Australia (Grabosky and Braithwaite, 1986) and Japan (Badaracco, 1985;  Haley, 1988;  Upham, 1987; Vogel, 1979) . Data Kagan, 1991; Vogel, 1986) . Distrust of the legislature by the courts and by litigants energized by the more vigorous American separation of powers (an institutionalization of distrust) is one factor that may have resulted in the creation of a more substantive jurisprudence by American courts. Distrust of the executive by interest groups (litigants) and the courts has led them to pursue the limitation of administrative discretion, driving regulators to more formal regulatory enforcement. In other words, courts and interest groups in America operationalize institutionalized distrust of the state by going substantive with statutory interpretation and by driving the executive to go formal with application of the law. Courts and interest groups play the separation of powers to seize power from the legislature by judicial discretion in the interpretation of statutes, just as they seize power from the executive by limiting its discretion.
While this is a way of reconciling two literatures on the greater formality of British jurisprudence and the greater formality of American regulatory enforcement, in this article we deal with a different comparison. We find that both Australian nursing-home law and Australian nursing-home regulatory practice are less formal than in the USA, which may express a higher degree of trust among the legislature, the executive, the industry and advocacy groupstripartite consensus building. This has meant in this arena (since 1987 reforms) that private interests rarely used courts or lobbied parliamentarians for more formal laws to achieve their objectives (Braithwaite, 1994 Kennedy (1976) and Mark Kelman (1987 (Kelman, 1987: 62; see also Michelman, 1986 ). Our case study shows this hope being more or less realized in Australia at least for one little domain of regulation for a very short period of history.' The point that Kelman Radin, 1989: 806 and n. 88; Rose, 1987: 606-10;  Sullivan, 1992) .
From another ideological perspective, we would put it that a rule-orientation in law conduces to liberal individualism, whereasa standard-orientation can both conduce to and depend on a degree of republican community. Rather, if it does not depend on a degree of republican community among those concerned with a particular issue, like nursing-home regulation, a standards-orientation will conduce to unchecked domination. Meidinger (1987) reports the existence of 'regulatory communities' even in the USA.
In the rules-versus-standards debate, CLS scholars pick up themes from American Legal Realists, who were fond of showing how the presumed precision of rules enabled imprecision. One reason they pointed to was that courts usually confront a choice of which of a number of precise yet contradictory rules they choose to invoke in a particular situation : 'each rule was in fact radically undercut by its fratricidal twin' (Kelman, 1987: 48; see Schlag, 1985: 409) . More- over, both realists and critical scholars indicate that often when the nominal rule is formally clear and consistent, the real operative rule for invoking it is opaque and inconsistent. The speed limit is 60, but the operating rules are that anything up to 65 or so will be ignored or let off with a warning (unless contempt is shown to the police officer or the officer wants to detain a person to check out compliance with some other rule). Hence the law and society injunction: study the law in action rather than the law in books. If your concern is consistency, you are bound to be misled unless you study consistency of the law in action. Our present study seeks some clarification of the rules-versus-standards debate by examining law in action. It shows empirically what CLS scholars assert when they say 'the text cannot define its context' (Schlag, 1985: 410 
):
If we concede that the sector of the social world cordoned off by directive can be affected by the external world, then the only way in which a directive can be certain is if it is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the effects of the external world.
This refutes the view that 'the choice between formulating or interpreting a legal directive as a rule or as a standard is a choice between ... certainty or flexibility, uniformity or individualization' (Schlag, 1985: 399 (McLeay Report, 1982; Giles Report, 1985) , the Australian government launched a package of nursing-home reforms in 1987. The first element of the package was a new set of 31 outcome-oriented standards negotiated through the active collaboration of federal and state governments, industry and professional, union and consumer groups. The consensus standards that attracted the assent of all these groups were so broad that they were attacked as 'motherhood statements' by many who were not immediately engaged in their negotiation. We agreed with these critics at the time. Moreover, while the standards were marketed as 'Outcome Standards for Australian Nursing Homes', many of them (listed in Table 1 ) did not look like outcomes to us. Since then, we learned that degree of outcome-orientation is primarily a matter of regulatory process design rather than standard-wording (Braithwaite et al., 1990:135-41) , a point to which we return.
Another fundamental concern we had about the new Australian standards was that they just could not be reliable. They were broad, subjective, lacking in detailed protocols,3 and the process by which they were to be rated was absolutely unattentive to sampling issues. Moreover, the process was residentcentred when we knew that a high proportion of residents would be confused and unreliable informants. Compounding these problems was a shift toward the inclusion of many 'soft' social and resident rights standards, in contrast to the previous exclusive focus on 'harder' structural (Braithwaite et al., 1991 (Braithwaite et al., 1991:13-15) . Only one nursing home refused to cooperate in a quota sample of 50 nursing homes with quotas for (a) number of beds in the home, (b) non-profit-for-profit status, (c) state and (d) composition of the inspection team. The sampling for the reliability study had to be quota sampling because the inspectors at the time were in the midst of working through the stratified random sample of homes that we had selected for our wider evaluation (Braithwaite et al.,1990) . Within the discretion allowed by their quotas, independent raters were instructed to be especially on guard against a bias toward 'easy' nursing homes. They were told: 'If you have to err, err on the side of homes which are more likely to be problem homes, because these will be the homes which give you more opportunities to disagree with the team.' As it turned out, independent raters did err quite significantly on the side of homes with more problems. While the average number of 'met' ratings for all homes was 23, the average number of 'met' ratings for homes in the reliability study was 18.
RESULTS
Agreement between the independent rater and the government inspection team was measured at three points in time. After the team completed its visit, the team met (usually the next day) to discuss as a team the positives and negatives observed on each standard and to agree on initial ratings. Soon after, they would meet with the independent rater to compare their (blind) initial ratings. The percent of agreement between these initial (totally independent) ratings are provided in the first column of (Braithwaite et al., 1991:18-30 (Braithwaite et al., 1990 (Braithwaite et al., ,1992 (Braithwaite et al., 1991; Braithwaite et al., 1992 (Braithwaite et al., 1990 (Braithwaite et al., , 1991 (Braithwaite et al., ,1992 (Gustafson et al., 1980 (Gustafson, 1977 (Gustafson et al.,1982 (Zimmerman et al.,1985) . While the number of data points for the reliability coefficients was only 13 (two teams visiting 13 homes in New York and Massachusetts), the results were much better. This time, with the teams in the nursing homes at the same time and in different states, 58 percent of deficiencies cited were cited by both teams. An impressive 84 percent of deficiencies detected by state teams were also detected by independent teams, though there was a much larger number of deficiencies detected by independent teams which were not detected by state teams.
Both teams returned to these nursing homes four months later to assess whether the deficiencies on which the two teams agreed had been corrected. The state teams judged 96 percent to be corrected and the independent teams 71 percent. In this study multiple regressions using the Wisconsin quality of care indicator found only weak validation of the number of deficiencies detected by inspectors (p < 0.1 ), but much stronger validation of the total severity of deficiencies detected (p <0.05).
The third American reliability study of the ratings of compliance with nursing-home regulations was based on double inspections of 21 Tennessee homes (Spector et al., 1987) . There was a one-day interval between visits to the nursing home. Both teams were inspectors from the Tennessee Department of Health and Environment. Both teams were large (averaging 8.7 for the (official) first team and 5.5 for the second validation team); and both had unusual breadth of disciplinary coverage -always including nurses, a generalist, a social worker, physiotherapist and pharmacist. The official team also included a dietician, sanitarian and fire inspector.
Only 25 percent of the regulations cited by the official team were also cited by the validation team (Spector et al., 1987:119-23 (Baldwin and Hawkins, 1984 (Goodin, 1982: 59-72 (Schuck, 1979:29 (Wiener and Kayser-Jones, 1989 . Briefly, we should at least say here that most resident outcomes that are the focus of debate within any sensible regulatory system will be uncontrovertially bad. We know that getting burnt in a fire, getting pills prescribed for someone else, or getting a decubitus ulcer are outcomes that residents are keen to avoid without having to ask them. Second, we use our fieldwork data to argue elsewhere that skilled inspectors know how to find those residents in a nursing home who will be outstanding informants on those issues that do require subjective feedback from residents and they also know how to get some useful information even from residents who spend most of their life extremely confused . The critics argue that it is harder, or even impossible, for a nursing home with many extremely high disability or demented residents to comply with standards under the more resident-centred process that we have in Australia.
Our data do not show this to be the case (Braithwaite et al.,1990: 73 Stories constitute a consciousness, a sensibility, a way of being out of which action will flow without recourse to specific instructions. Unlike rules, stories do not address action directly but rather constitute a sensibility out of which action flows. (Shearing, personal communication, 1993) Stories instruct the participants in a regulatory culture how to 'read', via a 'poetic apprehension', the layers of meaning in a situation. Shearing and Ericson (1991) show how this poetic apprehension is communicated through analogous reasoning -like advising young officers to avoid provocation in difficult situations by 'acting as if you were on holidays'. Nursing-home inspectors communicate a resident-centred sensibility, for example, with the analogous reason: 'Is this a home that you could be happy for your mother or grandmother to live in?' Reliable ratings will be maximally possible with a regulatory culture that accomplishes a common set of sensibilities through processes of dialogue.
Hence, a hotel chain can get staff pleasantness and decor to a state that appeals to consumers, but it will not accomplish this with a set of decor rules. Rather, it seeks to cultivate the right sort of sensibilities in its management and quality assurance staff with stories, concrete examples and analogies. Staff civility and pleasant decor then follow from these sensibilities.
The importance of legal standards is more in setting the framework and focus for storytelling, less as words that utter explicit guidance. (White, 1984: 27 (Braithwaite, 1994 In summary, we think it is fair to describe the initial Australian visit as reliably uncovering problems that can be exposed by shallow digging and reliably failing to uncover problems that can only be exposed by digging deeper. Moreover, it would improve the validity of the Australian process to adopt certain elements of the American process, such as the systematic observation of treatments. This is not to deny our more fundamental assertion that the best way to find the deepest problems is to follow leads rather than follow protocols. A police department that relies exclusively on the most sophisticated regimen of random patrol will not solve murders.
CONCLUSION
The classic work on the optimal precision of regulatory standards has been that of Colin Diver (1980 Diver ( , 1989 These conclusions can be read as part of a more general questioning of the claim that precision and the elimination of discretion though detailed regulatory law is a path to either greater consistency or equity (Hawkins, 1992) . Precision tends to 'permit by implication conduct that the rule was intended to forbid' (Posner, 1977: 425) . Detailed laws can provide a set of signposts to navigate around for those with the resources to employ a good legal navigator (Schoer, 1993) . While our focus here has been restricted to the effects of precision on consistency, precision-driven inconsistency can be theorized as a strategic resource of the powerful, particularly of repeat players who have an interest in playing for rules as well as for outcomes (thereby opening up a pattern of loopholes that suit the big players). As Max Weber (1954) showed: '[T]he more formal and complex the body of law becomes, the more it will operate in favour of formal rational bureaucratic groups such as corporations' (Sutton and Wild, 1978:195 At another point, Kelman (1987:44) (Kelman, 1987: 63) .
3.
There is a 20-page set of Standards Monitoring Guidelines (Department of Community Services and Health, 1988) . But these instruct inspectors only in 'key issues' and some of the things to 'look for' under each standard.
4.
A British study was conducted of the reliability of two standard protocols for the inspection of residential care homes (Gibbs and Sinclair, 1991 Part of the study was to check whether unreliability was caused by the reliability rater, in part, being in the facility at different times from the official team. This turned out to be a very minor source of unreliability (Braithwaite et al.,1991 (Spector and Drugovich,1989 (Rorty, 1979: 368; see also Wittgenstein,1972: 29-39) .
